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Disclosure of corporate risks and governance before,  
during and after the global financial crisis: case study in the UK 
construction industry in 2006-2009 
Nadezda Gulko, Catriona Hyde, Nina Seppala 
Abstract  
The recent financial crisis highlighted the importance of risk disclosures for investors 
and the wider society. We examined changes in risk disclosures in three UK-based 
construction companies before, during and after the financial crisis. The findings 
suggest that a crisis motivates a rise in the volume and quality of information provided 
by companies, while during periods of stability, companies generally provide less 
information and the quality of information is generic and repetitive in nature. Based on 
our research, a crisis enhances the overall volume of disclosures and this level of 
disclosure is maintained after the crisis, while any improvements in the quality of risk 
information are temporary. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 drew attention to the failure of corporate 
governance and financial reporting to provide relevant and reliable information about 
corporate performance and management of risks (Omberg, 2012; Quon et al, 2012; 
Boorman, 2009; Zalewska, 2014; Pinnuck, 2012; Goldin and Vogel, 2010; Souto, 2009; 
Riaz, 2009; De Bondt, 2010). The demand for greater transparency and high-quality 
narrative reporting in the aftermath of the financial crisis led to the introduction of new 
regulations and recommendations on risk disclosure. The main aim of these instruments 
was to enhance transparency and relevance of disclosed information because the 
awareness of company-specific risks and accuracy of market value are crucial factors 
for analysts, investors and professionals (Abraham and Shrives, 2014; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004). Mia and Al-Mamun (2011) note that companies increased risk 
disclosures over the period of the financial crisis, but the focus of these disclosures was 
more on increasing the amount of information rather than the quality of content. Despite 
the demand for greater transparency and high-quality narrative reporting, 
communication in annual reports has been viewed as a changeless area of “a major 
intellectual and logistical challenge” (ASB, 2009). Narrative statements often include 
boilerplate and generic disclosures rather than forward-looking, informative and specific 
content that would reduce the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015; Merkley, 2014; Li, 2010).  
Prior literature suggests that an increase in the level of informative disclosure can add 
value to the company and contribute to a higher share price (Einhorn, 2007; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006; Merkley, 2014). By increasing communication with stakeholders, 
companies facilitate confidence about their performance and risk practices, which, in 
turn, can lead to a lower cost of capital and market stability (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia 
  
2000; Armitage and Marston, 2008). Moreover, creating a positive social impression 
can be one of the incentives to increase voluntary disclosure (Sutantoputra, 2009). 
Voluntary disclosures can hence have a beneficial impact on company reputation as 
well as attract new shareholders and, consequently, increase market liquidity. 
Although corporate disclosure can bring benefits to companies, it also carries costs and 
may have a negative impact on competitive advantage (Hill and Short, 2009). As 
emphasised by ICAEW (2010), “Transparency in business reporting is significantly 
constrained by considerations of cost, competition, confidentiality and litigation”. Haji 
and Mohd Ghazali (2012) specify that companies reduce corporate disclosure due to the 
preparation costs, sensitive information that may benefit competitors, and potential 
damage arising from disclosing unfavourable information. ICAEW (2011) has 
recognised that the costs of preparing disclosures may exceed the potential advantages; 
therefore, this can promote the disclosure of generic and uniform statements which do 
not meet the needs of investors and other stakeholders. Moreover, as suggested by 
proprietary cost theory, businesses may be more concentrated on demonstrating their 
positive aspects rather than disclosing their risks (Ditlev-Simonsen, 2014).  
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate risk disclosures in three main ways. 
First, it provides a longitudinal analysis of changes in risk disclosures during a period of 
financial instability in 2006-2009 in order to examine the extent of risk disclosures 
before, during and after the crisis. The selected time span provides an opportunity to 
explore risk disclosure and risk transparency in different performance environments 
because of the turbulence created by the global financial crisis in the economy and 
corporate performance. Second, our study sheds light on the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate risk disclosure. The study focuses on the interaction 
between the size and independence of boards and risk disclosure. Third, our study 
  
provides insight on risk reporting in the UK construction industry which was severely 
affected by the financial crisis, but has not been studied to the same extent as other 
industries. Most prior studies have investigated the impact of the financial crisis on the 
banking sector (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Elbannan and Elbannan, 2015; Hassan, 
2014; Xifra and Ordeix, 2009). Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding 
of the relationship between turbulence in the external environment, financial 
performance and corporate risk disclosure. In doing so, it enhances understanding of the 
relevance and transparency of narrative risk disclosures in response to investor calls to 
receive more material and forward-looking information about corporate risks.  
 
2. Conceptual framework and hypothesis development 
Prominent corporate failures have increased public criticism of corporate governance 
controls (Bozec and Dia, 2015) and have led to a growing interest in the disclosure of 
risk in both academia and professional practice. The lack of adequate quantity and 
quality of risk reporting can be considered as one of the major weaknesses in accounting 
(Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Being primarily voluntary, the disclosure of risks is 
arguably highly subjective. In the absence of mandatory regulations, risk disclosure can 
vary widely in relation to its content as well as presentation format (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004; Campbell and Slack, 2008). Substantial prior literature exists on 
corporate disclosure investigating the quantity and quality of disclosure in corporate 
annual reporting (Li, 2010; Lee et al, 2003; Iatridis, 2011; Ryan, 2011; Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2008; Healy and Palepu, 2001). There is however insufficient empirical 
evidence on risk disclosure over the period of before, during and after the global 
financial crisis (Abraham et al, 2012; ASB 2009). Also, previous studies on corporate 
disclosure have limitations related to the use of cross-sectional analysis (Branco and 
  
Rodrigues, 2008; Chen and Roberts, 2010; Oliveira et al, 2011) and being descriptive in 
nature (ASB, 2009). 
 
2.1 Risk disclosures and the global financial crisis 
In the context of the global financial crisis, the majority of previous studies have 
focused on the analysis of financial firms (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Ismail and 
Rahman, 2011; Simplice, 2011; Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi, 2015; Elbannan and Elbannan, 
2015; Maffey et al, 2014; Hassan, 2014; Xifra and Ordeix, 2009; Moumen et al, 2015). 
The findings of these studies are mixed. On the one hand, researchers have found no 
change in corporate disclosure practice during or after the financial crisis. For example, 
Maffey et al (2014) investigated the risk disclosures of 66 Italian banks in 2011 arguing 
that this year represents a time period when banks should have paid greater attention to 
the level of disclosure, but the authors found no evidence of enhanced disclosure 
practice. Similarly, Simplice (2011) found that risk management disclosures did not 
provide any relevant data in the post-crisis year of 2008. In contrast, Ismail and Rahman 
(2011) provided evidence that risk management disclosures in Malaysian banks 
improved significantly between 2006 and 2009, rising from 83.82% in 2006 to 91.67% 
in 2009. This finding suggests that the global financial crisis resulted in a more careful 
focus on risk assessment and therefore contributed to a rise in the level of risk reporting. 
The findings by Moumen et al (2015) provide evidence on the usefulness of risk 
disclosure in corporate reporting through establishing a positive relation between risk-
related information and the market ability to forecast future earnings changes. 
Whilst a significant branch of research has focused on the banking industry, other 
authors have examined risk reporting practices in non-financial companies during the 
financial crisis, intentionally excluding the financial sector due to its special disclosure 
  
regulations (Ntim et al, 2013; Haji and Mohd Ghazali, 2012; Probohudono et al, 2013; 
Wang et al, 2013; Abraham and Shrives, 2014; Greco, 2012; Rodriguez Dominguez and 
Gamez, 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Al Zoubi and Al Zoubi, 2012). In order to 
investigate the impact of the financial crisis on different categories of risk disclosure, 
Probohudono et al (2013) focused their research on manufacturing companies in South 
East Asia. Aiming to understand the degree of predictor factors in risk communication 
in 2007-2009, the research revealed an average disclosure level of 28.61% for the three 
year period. The lowest level of disclosure was attributed to 2007 for all risk categories, 
whereas business and credit risks experienced a high level of disclosure in 2009. In 
terms of allocation amongst different categories of risks, business risk was accountable 
for the highest level of disclosure over time (41.81%), whereas strategic risk amounted 
to the lowest proportion (12.50%). Among significant studies is also Ntim et al (2013) 
who examined the interdependence between corporate governance and risk disclosure 
over the period of 2002-2011 in South Africa. The authors concluded that risk 
disclosure experienced a general improvement over ten years. With regard to the 
financial crisis, the results showed no support for a significant difference between risk 
disclosure before and after the crisis period of 2007-2008. Selected literature on 
disclosure and the global financial crisis is summarized in Table 1. 
-----Table 1----- 
 
2.2 Company specific disclosures as a strategic tool 
A number of previous studies have established a positive relationship between the 
volume of disclosure and profitability. For example, based on a cross-sectional study, 
Al-Najjar and Abed (2014) found a statistically significant relationship between the 
quantity of corporate disclosure and corporate performance. Similarly, examining a 
sample of Egyptian banks in 2002-2011, Elbannan and Elbannan (2015) found that the 
  
market share and profitability was higher in those banks with higher levels of risk 
disclosure, which can be explained by considering disclosure as a signal for a lower 
level of risk in these banks. Previous studies have also suggested that large 
organisations provide more risk information in comparison to smaller companies 
(Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).  
We propose that during a period of crisis, the positive relationship observed in prior 
studies between profitability and the volume of corporate disclosure does not hold. 
Instead, the volume of risk disclosures increases as the financial situation of the 
company weakens. As suggested by earlier research studying the impact of the financial 
crisis on corporate disclosure, companies increased their levels of corporate disclosure 
after the global financial crisis in order to influence the way in which they were being 
viewed in society and to reduce the negative effects caused by the crisis (Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Haji and Mohd Ghazali, 2012). Based on this reasoning, the following 
proposition can be developed:  
P1.  The volume of company-specific disclosures increases in the aftermath of a 
financial crisis.  
 
2.3 Leverage and the level of risk disclosure  
The level of leverage is another important factor that may contribute to the volume and 
quality of risk communication in annual reports. As the level of debt increases, the 
demand for additional information about the company’s ability to satisfy its financial 
obligations also increases (Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez, 2014). It can be expected 
that an increase in risk disclosure serves as a justification and explanation of the 
unfavourable conditions within the company and how they are being addressed (Amran 
  
et al, 2008). From this follows that the second proposition can be formulated as the 
positive relationship between leverage and disclosure:  
P2.  Levels of leverage are positively associated with the volume of company-
specific disclosures. 
 
2.4 Quality and specificity of disclosure 
Prior studies suggest that companies tend to provide vague rather than substantive and 
company specific information about risks. Abraham and Shrives (2014) argued that 
companies disclose symbolic risk information which is limited or have no “relation to 
the actual risks faced by companies” due to proprietary costs and institutional factors. 
Similarly, Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez (2014) found that most Spanish 
companies provide vague risk information and the largest companies specifically avoid 
detailed disclosure due to the possible negative effects of such disclosure for 
competitive advantage. At the same time, researchers have argued that companies with 
poor performance provide investors with more informative and higher quality 
disclosures than well-performing companies (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015).  
We propose that the quality of information provided by companies facing a decline in 
profitability or generally weak performance is more detailed and related to the company 
and its particular circumstances. In our research, we explore the nature of disclosure 
statements during the financial crisis to shed light on the use of risk disclosure as a 
strategic tool that may serve as a method to improve communication and raise trust with 
stakeholders in the context of a crisis and fluctuating financial performance. We expect 
to see an increase in the quality of disclosures through an increase in the company-
specific information provided by the companies as the financial situation worsens. We 
  
propose that companies disclose more information about their risks and related 
management practices for the purpose of sustaining investor confidence. 
P3.   The quality of corporate disclosures becomes more specific during a period of 
crisis.  
 
2.5 Risk disclosure and time orientation 
The predictability of risks in advance of significant events is arguably one of the key 
drivers underpinning calls for increased risk disclosures as discussed by Solomon 
(2013). However, companies prevalently provide information about past and present 
risks, avoiding the provision of forward-looking risk information (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004). There is some evidence to suggest that there are companies that 
provide more future orientated than backward looking information (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006). Overall, however, earlier research has found that most corporate reports 
comprise backward-looking information which facilitates the reduction of exposure to 
litigation, whilst representing little usefulness for investors due to generic statements 
that lack comparability and transparency (Oliveira et al, 2011). Abraham et al (2012) 
found in their study that a mere 16% of narrative disclosures was future-related. 
Similarly, a study conducted by Abraham and Shrives (2014) showed that events are 
discussed in annual reports after they occur rather than before they take place. As a 
result, the authors recommend that shareholders should question the disclosure of vague 
and routinely repeated information in annual reports. Investors should call for reliable, 
relevant and forward-looking risk disclosure. We propose that companies increase the 
provision of forward looking information during a financial crisis in order to enhance 
trust among the investor community about the company’s ability to manage the 
situation: 
  
P4.  Companies provide more future-oriented disclosures during a period of crisis.  
 
2.6 Links to corporate governance 
Being an essential “mechanism for addressing agency problems and controlling the 
firm’s risk-taking”, focus on corporate governance has been one of the responses to the 
financial crisis (Tarraf and Majeske, 2013). The quantity and quality of risk-related 
information in annual reports in relation to the corporate governance mechanisms is an 
area of significant research interest (Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014; Oliveira et al, 2011; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Lim et al, 2007; Lajili, 
2009; Solomon et al, 2000; Bonaci et al, 2012). The most widely used corporate 
governance factors include: company size, board size and board independence. Even 
though corporate governance variables generally change over a relatively long time 
period, the financial crisis may have presented a sudden shock that led companies to 
redesign their corporate governance structures including the size and nature of the 
board. In what follows, we discuss three corporate governance factors: company size, 
board size, and board independence. 
2.6.1 Company Size  
A large number of studies have investigated the impact of company size on corporate 
governance and disclosure (Probohudono et al, 2013; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Amran et al, 2008; Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014). It has been 
argued that larger companies provide a higher volume of disclosures because of the 
importance of communicating effectively with a large pool of stakeholders (Amran et 
al, 2008). Also, they are better able to cover the costs of voluntary disclosure due to 
their better financial resources (Probohudono et al, 2013). Larger companies also rely 
on external finance, which requires better communication of risks to investors (Elzahar 
  
and Hussainey, 2012). The level of political visibility of large companies is another 
factor that is likely to enhance disclosure in larger companies to reduce the costs of 
being perceived as ambiguous (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015). In contrast, Watson et 
al (2002) argue that the costs of disclosing voluntary information can be high or even 
unaffordable for small companies. Thus, we expect the size of the company to be related 
to the level of risk disclosure and propose that company size is likely to influence the 
level of the disclosure of risk information in annual reports. Therefore, the following 
proposition can be developed: 
P5.  The level of the disclosure of risk information in annual reports is related to 
company size.  
 
2.6.2 Board Size  
The importance of the board function and the potential consequences of its failure have 
been highlighted by the global financial crisis (Solomon, 2013). The board plays a 
significant role in setting an appropriate corporate governance practice (Brown et al, 
2009) and in controlling and disclosing strategic information (Mohd Hafiz et al, 2014). 
Abdullah and Page (2009) assert that it is larger boards with more experience and high 
managerial ownership and not corporate governance itself that leads to better 
monitoring of risks. Being responsible for defining and alleviating risks, boards may 
represent the potential source of corporate risks, for example, by a failure to understand 
the consequences of their strategic decisions. 
A number of prior studies have found that board size is positively related to the extent 
of voluntary disclosure because an increase in the board size is accompanied with a 
diversity of board members which leads to higher quality of corporate decisions and as 
a consequence the provision of high quality information (Ntim et al, 2013; Rodriguez 
  
Dominguez and Gamez, 2014). An optimally composed board provides the right 
balance in the combination of skills, level of expertise and professional judgment for 
enhancing the efficacy of the board. 
While size is positively related to the effectiveness of the board, large boards may 
become unwieldy and inefficient. Several previous studies suggest that large boards can 
lead to the reduction of governance efficacy. For example, Guest (2009) concluded on 
the basis of a large sample of companies that board size has a negative impact on firm 
performance because the effectiveness of a large board is restricted by lack of 
communication, control and decision-making. It is likely that large boards have a higher 
volume of internal dissent and more complexity in decision-making. As a result, large 
boards may be reluctant to reveal voluntary information about risks (Rodriguez 
Dominguez and Gamez, 2014). Based on the above arguments, we formulated the 
following proposition: 
P6.  Board size is connected to the disclosure of risk in annual reports. 
 
2.6.3 Board Independence  
Board effectiveness has been connected to its degree of independence and 
recommendations exist on the independence of boards. According to the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance, ‘at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should 
comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent’ (FRC, 
2003, p.7, section A.3.2). Independent directors have a favourable impact on the quality 
of decision-making because of their outside experience and their presence reduces 
agency conflicts. At the same time, independent directors may result in a diminished 
level of governance efficiency and effectiveness because outside directors may not have 
  
sufficient knowledge about the company to be able to scrutinise and contribute 
positively to the governance of the company (Rodriguez Dominguez and Gamez, 2014).  
The majority of previous studies suggest a positive relationship between independent 
directors and corporate reporting showing the importance of independent boards for 
providing risk-related information. The presence of independent directors not only helps 
to improve communication of risk information and positively affects voluntary 
disclosure (Beretta and Bozzoland, 2004; Probohudono et al, 2013; Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but it also performs the role of a key 
indicator of the effectiveness of corporate governance function (Solomon, 2013). 
Arguably, non-executive, independent directors should increase the dissemination of 
information about corporate risks because they have fewer personal interests linked to 
the company which allows them to support the provision of risk information.  
An extensive study conducted by Abraham and Cox (2007) demonstrated the 
importance of independent directors because of the balance they bring to the board that 
enables the company to better meet shareholder expectations relating to accountability 
and transparency. Similarly, a study carried out by Lajili (2009) showed that Canadian 
companies provide more risk-related information if the majority of their board members 
are independent. Personal reputation of non-executive directors can be also one of the 
factors for more enhanced disclosure on risks as independent directors act as corporate 
outsiders with little involvement in daily operations (Oliveira et al, 2011). Finally, 
Barakat and Hussainey (2013) investigated bank governance, regulation and risk 
reporting in 85 EU banks in 2007-2008 and found that the quality of risk disclosure can 
be improved by the introduction of independent supervisors or by increasing the 
proportion of outside board directors. Therefore, board independence can be expected to 
explain changes in risk disclosure and the following proposition can be formulated: 
  
P7.  Board independence is connected to the disclosure of risks in annual reports. 
 
3. Data and methods  
3.1 Data and sample selection 
We adopted a longitudinal research design for studying changes in risk disclosure over a 
four year period from 2006 to 2009. As shown in Figure 1, the time period covers the 
global financial crisis (GFC) from before the crisis in 2006 to its aftermath in 2009, 
enabling the analysis of the volume and quality of risk disclosure against different levels 
of profitability and leverage as well as changes in corporate governance structures 
introduced in the period following the financial crisis. Even though the financial crisis 
can be seen as a unique event, it provides an opportunity to study the same set of 
companies in the context of varying levels of financial performance and corporate 
governance structures.   
-----Figure 1----- 
Three companies listed on the London Stock Exchange FTSE100 were selected for the 
study. Following Linsley and Shrives (2006), Elzahar and Hussainey (2012) and 
Abraham and Cox (2007), FTSE100 was used as a pool of companies for the study 
because larger companies were expected to provide more information about risks and 
therefore a richer source of data for exploring the research questions. The three 
companies – Barratt Developments plc, Persimmon plc, and Taylor Wimpey plc – 
operated in the construction sector and represented all the companies listed from this 
sector in FTSE100 during the period of study. They shared a similar regulatory 
framework of risk disclosures with companies from other sectors with the exception of 
financial companies that had specific characteristics resulting from a different 
  
framework for disclosure practices (Beretta and Bozzolan 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). A list of the companies and their market capitalisation 
is given in Table 2. Representing one of the largest sectors within the UK economy, the 
construction industry is perceived to be exposed to complex risks due to the 
interconnections in construction projects. Gruenberg et al (2007) argue that because of 
the uniqueness of building projects, it is highly difficult to predict risks and the impact 
they may have on the company. However, larger companies tend to be more resilient to 
unexpected crisis conditions and, in contrast to small and medium companies, are less 
likely to face bankruptcy in the building sector. Therefore, because our sample consists 
of three large companies, the findings may not be generalisable to medium-sized 
companies or other industries. 
-----Table 2----- 
3.2 Dependent variable: risk disclosure  
Content analysis has been widely used in accounting research to measure corporate risk 
disclosure in annual reports (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Greco, 2012; Hill and Short, 2009; Maffei et al, 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; 
Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014; Li, 2010). As a well-established method, content analysis is 
applied “for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their 
use” where reproducibility of findings plays an essential role (Krippendorff, 2004, 
p.18). In content analysis, words or other units of text are analysed in order to quantify 
or explore them against predetermined themes or categories. Coding units typically 
include sentences, paragraphs or words depending on the focus of the research 
(Bowman, 1984).  
  
In our research, the dataset included a total of 12 annual reports covering four fiscal 
years for three companies (2006-2009). Narrative information from the following 
sections of the annual reports was analysed: the Chairman’s statement, the Group Chief 
Executive’s statement, the Business and Financial reviews and the Director’s report. We 
extracted a total of 860 sentences from the annual reports and examined them as risk 
disclosure statements in order to identify possible themes and patterns.   
Adapting the risk disclosure index developed by Abraham and Shrives (2014), we 
extracted risk-related sentences from the annual reports and categorised them into two 
groups: 1) generic risk statements and 2) specific risk statements. Sentences were coded 
as risk disclosures if the reader was informed about threats or opportunities that had 
impacted or were going to impact the company or its environment. As suggested by 
Linsley and Shrives (2006), only risks that we explicitly stated were included in the 
pool of disclosure sentences; vague or implied statements were excluded from the 
analysis. This approach has been adopted in a number of risk disclosure studies using 
content analysis to investigate annual reports (e.g. Abraham and Cox, 2007; Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012).     
Selecting sentences as the main unit of analysis is a common approach to disclosure 
measurement because of the reliability of sentences in comparison to the analysis of 
other textual units such as words and pages (Amran et al, 2008). Sentences enable a 
more accurate identification of relevant content than words because of the context 
provided by the sentence for interpreting the meaning of specific words and whether 
they constitute a risk disclosure. Recent studies in risk disclosures have adopted 
sentences as the primary coding unit (e.g. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006), although in some studies both sentences and words have been used to 
increase the reliability of the results (Abraham and Cox, 2007). However, the selection 
  
of individual words as the main unit of disclosure analysis is unlikely to have a material 
effect on the results (Milne and Adler, 1999).  
3.3 Independent variables: financial measures  
Financial performance was studied using standard measures and sources as shown in 
Table 3. The measures were calculated for the three companies for each of the four 
financial years in order to study changes over the study period.   
-----Table 3----- 
3.4 Independent variables: corporate governance 
To explore the relationship between corporate governance factors and risk disclosure, 
three characteristics of corporate governance were collected and measured in line with 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012). Table 4 displays the measurements of the independent 
variables which are consistent with several past studies. First, as a measure of company 
size, total assets at the end of the fiscal year was used. Second, board size was measured 
as the total number of board members over the study period. Third, board independence 
was measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board.  
-----Table 4----- 
3.5 Market capitalisation  
The UK construction industry faced the hardest conditions because of the impact of the 
GFC showing the deepest annual decline in house prices and affecting the whole 
economy (Ball, 2010). It is worth noting though that “the UK construction industry’s 
performance following the 2008 slowdown was initially similar to that experienced in 
previous slowdowns” (Office for National Statistics, 2013). 
  
Market capitalisation, which can be considered as the most accurate measure of 
shareholder value, demonstrated a decreasing confidence between 2006 and 2008 years 
in the ability of the companies to survive the crisis period. Market capitalisation of 
Taylor Wimpey and Barratt Development decreased by 93.96% and 91.15% 
respectively, and the capitalisation of Persimmon dropped by 84.73% over the period 
(Figure 2). Given the hitting market conditions in 2008 and the collapsed value of the 
big construction companies, many financial analysts raised concerns forecasting a close 
breach of the banking agreements for companies including Persimmon, Barratt 
Developments and Taylor Wimpey (Treanor and Wearden, 2008). 
----- Figure 2----- 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Volume of disclosure 
When averaged across the three companies, the volume of risk related disclosures 
increased throughout the period studied from 2006 to 2009. As shown in Figure 3, the 
biggest increases in disclosures took place in 2007 and in 2008 after which the volume 
of disclosures appeared to stabilise. More specifically, the overall number of disclosures 
increased by 59.38% in 2007 and 98.04% in 2008. By 2009, the number of disclosures 
increased only slightly by 2% suggesting that a plateau had been reached. The financial 
crisis therefore saw an increase in the volume of risk disclosure that reflected the 
introduction of new recommendation by governments and accounting bodies.     
At company level, Barratt, with the lowest number of disclosures in 2006 in comparison 
to the other two companies, saw the highest increase in disclosures from a total of 17 
disclosures in 2006 to 144 in 2009 (747.06%). The other two companies, Taylor 
  
Wimpey and Persimmon, which both started with a higher volume of disclosures in 
2006, saw a considerable, but a less steep increase in disclosures from 34 to 64 
(88.24%) and from 46 to 100 (117.40%) respectively. Overall, the analysis suggests that 
a larger volume of disclosures were made by all the companies with the largest 
increases seen with the companies starting from a lower base. 
There was a high degree of difference between the number of disclosures provided by 
the companies across the period of study. For example, in 2006, the number of 
disclosures varied from 17 to 46 and in 2009 from 64 to 144. One company, Taylor 
Wimpey, had the highest level of disclosures throughout the period of study except for 
2009 when Barratt provided a higher number of disclosures. On average, the number of 
disclosures increased from 32 in 2006 to 102 in 2009 across the three companies. It will 
be argued later that the volume of disclosures provided by Taylor Wimpey through the 
study period may be connected to the company’s board composition.  
-----Figure 3----- 
The movements in the volume of risk disclosures corresponded to the movements in 
company profitability. As can be seen in Figure 4, when Return-on-Assets (ROA) as a 
measure of profitability experienced a downward trend, the volume of disclosures 
increased.  
----- Figure 4----- 
4.2 Quality of disclosure 
4.2.1 Generic versus company specific information 
Narrative risk disclosures were investigated with regard to their generic and specific 
nature. The analysis showed that generic information about risks increased throughout 
  
the period studied. In parallel, the provision of company specific information increased 
particularly in 2007 and 2008, but declined in 2009 when the financial crisis started to 
settle. The analysis of narrative information showed that Taylor Wimpey provided the 
most detailed and company specific information in comparison to the other companies. 
Overall, as shown in Figure 5, companies provided more generic than company specific 
information throughout the period under investigation. Also, the volume of generic and 
company specific disclosures did not always develop in the same way even though both 
increased over the period studied.  
-----Figure 5----- 
 
When basic risk characteristics and risk management policies were analysed separately, 
a relatively higher increase was seen in the discussion of basic risk characteristics. 
Information about risk management policies also grew but to a lesser degree, which 
suggests that the companies considered it more important to shed light on risks and how 
they were affecting the company rather than disclosure information about policies that 
had been used to deal with risk.  
The detailed examination of the narrative content of the annual reports shows that in 
2006, there were no signs or caution about the possibility of future changes in the 
companies’ performance or market risks. For example, Barratt stated that its “record 
forward sales, strengthened land bank and strong finances’ provide ‘a healthy position 
for the coming year” (Barratt, 2006, p.14). At the same time, Persimmon stated its 
confidence about “the underlying strength of the housing market” and “ability to grow 
[…] business over future years” (Persimmon, 2006, p.2). In a similar way, Taylor 
Wimpey showed an overall confidence in the future.  
In 2007, a year before the peak of the financial crisis, the annual reports demonstrated a 
degree of doubt and uncertainty, but the statements were generally vague. Moreover, the 
  
majority of information related to risk factors and internal control was largely copied 
from previous reports and only a small amount of new information was provided. In line 
with prior research (Abraham and Shrives, 2014), this repetitive information shows that 
companies do not provide a full update of their risks on an annual basis. The generic 
and repeated nature of the disclosed information in years 2006 and 2007 is an example 
of information provided during years of perceived stability.  
Only in the annual reports of 2008 when the economic, market and financial conditions 
were at their peak of turbulence did companies provide more specific and unique 
information in their statements. As acknowledged by Taylor Wimpey (2008, p. 28), 
“2008 was the most challenging year that the housing market has encountered in recent 
history”. Moreover, 2008 was the only year when the reports included more new 
information than repeated content from previous years. However, in the following year 
in 2009, the disclosure of specific information about risks either decreased or stopped to 
rise in all three cases. 
Overall, narrative information in the annual reports was characterised by a low degree 
of comparability within and across companies. During periods of perceived stability in 
2006 and 2007, companies avoided disclosure about the uncertainties faced by them and 
the provision of company specific information. The period of crisis in 2008 provoked 
companies to offer more meaningful and specific information that communicated their 
risk profiles to the shareholders and other stakeholders. There are several possible 
explanations for this increase in the quality of information. For example, companies are 
more dependent on stakeholders, inflows of new investments, and corporate image 
during periods of crisis and therefore communicate more with their stakeholders. In 
summary, the harder the economic and financial conditions are, the more concrete and 
reliable narrative disclosure is. 
  
4.2.2 Forward orientation 
The majority of narrative reporting consisted of historical statements and descriptions 
about past events. The usefulness of such retrospective and backward orientated 
information is questionable in terms of its relevance for predicting significant events in 
the future. For example, the presentation of corporate risks disclosed in the annual 
reports before the financial crisis did not reflect subsequent financial performance. It 
was only in 2008 that the reports included substantial information that was forward 
orientated. In this year, all three companies anticipated difficulties in the following year 
and discussed factual details about the possible risks and risk factors they might face. 
They also signaled caution about the speediness of recovery.  
As briefly discussed above, the risk statements included a substantial amount of copied 
data from previous annual reports. This repeated information may not necessarily reflect 
the actual risk situation a company is facing and it may therefore fail to provide 
stakeholders with relevant, current and useful information which is essential for making 
informed investment and other decisions. The tendency to generalization and 
symbolism in narrative reporting, particularly with regard to periods of stable 
profitability and leverage arrangements, appears to provide little new or valuable 
information to readers about current or future risks. Our analysis therefore suggests that 
annual reports provide little information about significant risks and other issues that 
enable investors to make informed decisions about the future.  
4.3 Leverage and disclosure 
Figure 6 illustrates the growth in debt usage in 2008 and 2009 in comparison to 2006 
and 2007. From the years included in the study, 2008 was the most critical year for all 
  
three companies when they took “tough decisions over the course of 2008 in the face of 
an unprecedented global economic backdrop” (Taylor Wimpey, 2008, p. 1).  
-----Figure 6----- 
The surge in the average borrowings in comparison to equity took place when the 
companies were not able to obtain equity finance through existing shareholders due to 
the extraordinary level of uncertainty in the economic and financial conditions which 
resulted in the rejection of financial support by large investors. As a result, the financial 
indebtedness required urgent actions by the three companies in terms of restructuring 
debts and finding measures for adapting to the extraordinary market conditions.  
Taking advantage of their big size, the three largest housebuilders undertook relatively 
similar measures for preventing failures, servicing debts, and slowly stabilising 
businesses at time of financial difficulty. For example, in 2008 Barratt Developments 
reached agreements with banks to refinance their loans of £400m, waived covenants on 
the rest of their debts of £1.7bn, and wrote down the value of their land bank by £85m 
(Russell and Monaghan, 2008). As for Taylor Wimpey, in order to avert a collapse and 
to cut its debt since a failed fund raising in 2008, they still managed to raise £510m via 
the fully underwritten share issue in 2009 and to refinance £2.5bn of the company debts 
which resolved uncertainty around company’s viability (Fildes, 2009). Similarly, 
Persimmon renegotiated the terms of their existing debt and acquired new banking 
facilities, bringing the total credit facilities to slightly more than £1bn with a burden to 
pay interest rates on the loan that were 75 per cent higher than before (Pearson and 
Fickling, 2009). Apart from measures taken on companies’ level, two factors played an 
important role in boosting the housing market: the governmental ‘NewBuy initiative’ 
provided “a guarantee to banks that offer 95 per cent mortgages” and “the Bank of 
  
England’s Funding for Lending Scheme”, which helped banks to introduce more 
affordable rates on loans (Plimmer and Wembridge, 2013). 
Although the new financing deals and the restructuring removed the immediate danger 
of going into bankruptcy, analysts warned that these actions could have significant 
drawbacks and inherited costs consisting in increased interest rates and more expensive 
debts which have to be paid back through asset sales (Russell and Monaghan, 2008). 
Another result of the higher debt-equity ratio related to structural reconsiderations with 
the outcome of closing divisions and reducing staff. For example, Barratt announced the 
redundancy of about 1200 people in 2008, Persimmon reduced its operational and 
administrative staff by 55%, and Taylor Wimpey launched similar redundancy 
programmes.  
----- Figure 7----- 
Regarding the relationship between leverage and corporate disclosure, the level of 
leverage corresponded to the volume of company specific risk disclosure. Figure 7 
portrays that company specific risk disclosures increased as leverage rose in 2007. Risk 
disclosures also increased in 2008 as leverage rose further, but when the level of debt 
declined in 2009, the volume of disclosures also fell. The analysis therefore suggests 
that when companies are perceived to be close to financial distress and bankruptcy, 
company leadership may decide to mitigate this situation through increasing the level of 
communication with shareholders and the financial community. This finding is in line 
with prior research by Mia and Al-Mamun (2011).  
4.4 Links to corporate governance 
4.4.1 Company size and disclosure 
  
Table 5 indicates that Barratt’s and Taylor Wimpey’s total assets, as a measure of 
company size, almost doubled between 2006 and 2007 mainly due to a rise in 
inventories, intangible assets, goodwill, investments and swaps. Persimmon’s size of 
total assets showed a similar upward trend in 2007, albeit less steep. Afterwards, there 
was a steady decrease in the company size for all the three companies in 2008 and a 
further drop in 2009 because of a diminished level of inventories, receivables and 
goodwill impairments. 
-----Table 5----- 
When comparing average company size from 2006 to 2009 with the number of total and 
specific risk disclosures, it can be stated that the increase in the provision of company 
specific as well as total disclosures in 2007 reflected a substantial rise of company size 
in the same year. Meanwhile, a significant decline of the average company size in 2008-
2009 corresponded to a decrease in the provision of company specific information in 
2009. 
4.4.2 Board size  
-----Figure 8----- 
The analysis reveals that the lowest number of board directors was registered in 2007 in 
all the three companies (Figure 8). By the end of the study period in 2009, all the three 
companies had 10 board members. Overall, the number of board members changed 
almost on an annual basis and fluctuated between 7 and 11 members. Because of the 
relatively small number of board members and the constant fluctuation in numbers, no 
generalisation can be made in relation to risk disclosure.  
4.4.3 Board independence  
  
As shown in Figure 9, the average level of independent directors rose from 61% in 2006 
to 63% in 2009. All the companies were in compliance with the Corporate Governance 
Code by maintaining a level of independent directors at 50% or higher. The lowest 
proportion of independent directors was attributed to 2007 for all the three companies, 
while the highest percentage manifested itself in 2008. These trends can be explained by 
the actions taken by the companies in response to the financial crisis and for stabilising 
their financial position and governance. 
The analysis also provides support for the argument that there is a relationship between 
the level of specific disclosures and the proportion of independent directors. For 
example, in 2008, Taylor Wimpey had the highest percentage of independent directors 
(75%). In this year, it also had the highest number of total and specific disclosures 
amongst all the three companies. In previous literature, it has been argued that 
independent directors facilitate the provision of information about risks and therefore 
improve the quality of disclosed information (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004).  
-----Figure 9----- 
Overall, the size of the board did not change significantly in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, but it fluctuated throughout the period studied. In contrast, the boards of 
the three companies saw an increase in the number of independent directors 
immediately after the crisis. The findings therefore demonstrate that companies can 
react quickly by increasing the number of independent directors that has been 
previously associated with the volume of risk-related information made available by 
companies (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013; Lajili, 2009). As suggested by Oliveira et al 
(2011), the personal reputation of independent directors may help companies to enhance 
their reputation in an uncertain and volatile environment. 
  
 
5. Discussion of findings 
The global financial crisis highlighted the growing demand for relevant and reliable 
information about risks by corporate stakeholders including investors, regulatory 
authorities and governments. The present study set out with the aim of exploring 
corporate disclosure practices among UK construction companies over the period of 
2006-2009. Applying content analysis to the annual reports of the three companies, we 
investigated the volume and quality of risk disclosure over the period of study. In 
addition, we examined the extent to which corporate governance factors were associated 
with changes in corporate disclosure. The findings of the study contribute to literature in 
corporate disclosure by investigating how disclosure practices vary between a relatively 
stable time and a period of crisis.  
5.1 Disclosures 
Our findings provide support for earlier research showing that risk disclosures increased 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Haji and Mohd 
Ghazali, 2012). Our analysis showed that the volume of risk disclosures increased 
throughout the period of 2006-2009 but seemed to reach a plateau after the financial 
crisis had peaked in 2008. The largest increases in the volume of disclosures were seen 
in the company that started from the lowest base. The financial crisis therefore saw an 
increase in the volume of risk disclosure and particularly in those companies that 
provided relatively little information before the crisis.  
Overall, companies provided more generic than company specific information 
throughout the period under investigation. The generic and repeated nature of the 
disclosed information in years 2006 and 2007 supports previous research findings about 
  
the general and symbolic nature of risk disclosure (Abraham and Shrives, 2014). 
Similarly, the repeated content of disclosure statements suggests that companies do not 
provide fully new and updated information on an annual basis. However, our findings 
add to the existing literature by showing that during a period of crisis, not only the 
volume, but the quality of corporate risk disclosure improves. This finding is supported 
by the observation that the provision of company-specific information decreased or 
remained at the same level in 2009 once the economy began to recover after the crisis. 
However, the companies considered it more important to shed light on risks and how 
they were affecting the company rather than disclosure information about policies that 
had been used to deal with risk. The increase in the quality of disclosures in times of 
crisis can be considered as a measure taken by the companies to communicate with their 
investors and to improve confidence in the company among shareholders.  
The findings of our study further suggest that the majority of data in narratives consists 
of historical statements and descriptions about past events, questioning the usefulness of 
such post-factum and backward-oriented information for its relevance for predicting 
future events. The companies were reluctant to provide new information and their 
disclosures were dominated by information copied from previous reports. Overall, our 
analysis suggests that annual reports provide little information about significant risks 
and other issues that enable investors to make informed decisions about the future. 
These findings support prior research according to which companies are reluctant to 
provide forward-looking information (Abraham et al, 2012; Abraham and Shrives, 
2014; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Our findings add to the existing literature by 
showing that crisis periods may provoke companies to provide more forward oriented 
information, but this change is temporary.    
  
It has been argued that rising level of debts and financial distress have the effect of 
spurring the number of risk-related statements in annual reports (Rodriguez Dominguez 
and Gamez, 2014). Our results support these prior findings and show that the companies 
studied suffered from a detrimental stock market value in 2007 and 2008 when the 
financial performance and position in all three cases demonstrated significant leverage 
risks and this corresponded to an increase of risk disclosures by the companies. Based 
on this, it can be suggested that when companies are close to financial distress and 
bankruptcy, they seek to mitigate these situations by increasing the level of 
communication with stakeholders.  
5.2 Corporate governance and disclosure 
Our examination of the relationship between company size and disclosure of risk 
information supports the findings of previous studies by showing that the size of the 
company influences its ability and willingness to communicate about risk (Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Al-Najjar and Abed, 2014; Amran et al, 2008). Our findings suggest 
that the increase in the provision of company specific and total disclosures in 2007 
reflected a substantial rise in average company size in 2007. This connection may be 
explained by the larger pool of stakeholders that larger companies have and the related 
interest in receiving communication about risks, particularly during a period of 
instability.  
We were not able to make conclusions about the interdependence between board size 
and the volume of risk disclosure because of the limited data set. There are external 
factors that can influence changes in board composition particularly in the period of 
financial distress that may have caused the observed fluctuations in the size of boards. 
Also, a larger set of companies is needed for investigating this relationship.  
  
Our analysis suggests that the level of total and company specific disclosures may 
correspond to the proportion of independent directors. This finding supports previous 
studies that have identified board independence as an important variable explaining 
changes in corporate disclosure (Oliveira et al, 2011; Ntim et al, 2013). One of the 
possible explanations for this relationship is that non-executive independent directors 
are more motivated to increase voluntary disclosure levels due to having fewer personal 
interests and for maintaining reputational capital (Probohudono et al, 2013). 
Future research is needed to examine the relationship between corporate disclosure and 
corporate governance factors based on a larger sample of companies from different non-
financial industries. Extending the end period of study from 2009 year to 2011 and 
beyond would allow to examine more fundamentally changes in corporate disclosure 
before, during and after the global financial crisis. Future research may also wish to 
consider the disclosure patterns before, during and after the GFC by the medium-sized 
companies, including statistics about their survival mechanisms to overcome financial 
distress. It would also be interesting to see research on the proportion of new 
information in annual reports in contrast to copied data from previous reports.  
5.3 Managerial and regulation implications 
Regarding managerial and policy implications of our findings, stakeholders rely on the 
annual reports as the main source of receiving relevant and comparable information 
about risks and opportunities, whereas disclosures can be constrained as companies may 
prefer to limit their narratives because of the costs, agency conflicts, and potential 
damage to competitive advantage. The voluntary nature of corporate disclosure can be 
associated with a lack of transparency and meaningfulness of the communication 
between companies and their shareholders, despite the attempts to enhance regulation 
and to increase reliability of narrative reporting. Our findings suggest that an increase in 
  
the amount of disclosure may not be indicative of higher quality. In order to enhance the 
relevance and usefulness of disclosed information, regulation of risk disclosures should 
ensure that information is regularly updated and more future oriented. The emphasis 
should be on the quality of disclosure about possible future risks rather than just an 
increase in the amount of generic, vague and backward-looking statements which lack 
of usefulness for investors.  
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